Paper: arXiv 2404.03976
Abstract
In the ever evolving landscape of decentralized finance automated market makers (AMMs) play a key role: they provide a market place for trading assets in a decentralized manner. For so-called bluechip pairs, arbitrage activity provides a major part of the revenue generation of AMMs but also a major source of loss due to the so-called informed orderflow. Finding ways to minimize those losses while still keeping uninformed trading activity alive is a major problem in the field. In this paper we will investigate the mechanics of said arbitrage and try to understand how AMMs can maximize the revenue creation or in other words minimize the losses. To that end, we model the dynamics of arbitrage activity for a concrete implementation of a pool and study its sensitivity to the choice of fee aiming to maximize the value retention. We manage to map the ensuing dynamics to that of a random walk with a specific reward scheme that provides a convenient starting point for further studies.
Complexity vs Empirical Score
- Math Complexity: 7.0/10
- Empirical Rigor: 3.0/10
- Quadrant: Lab Rats — theoretically deep, empirically untested
Why this score: The paper employs advanced stochastic modeling and calculus to map AMM arbitrage dynamics to random walks, indicating high math complexity. However, it relies entirely on theoretical simulations and synthetic data without backtesting or real-world datasets, resulting in low empirical rigor.
Research Flowchart
flowchart TD
A["Research Goal: Determine optimal AMM fees<br>to maximize value retention"] --> B{"Methodology"};
B --> C["Model Arbitrage Dynamics<br>for Concrete AMM Implementation"];
C --> D["Simulate Activity & Analyze<br>Sensitivity to Fee Parameter"];
D --> E["Map Dynamics to<br>Random Walk with Reward Scheme"];
E --> F["Key Finding: Fee Optimization<br>Directly Impacts Value Retention"];
F --> G["Outcome: Theoretical Framework<br>for Future AMM Design"]
Cited References (35)
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- An Economic Model of a Decentralized Exchange with Concentrated Liquidity (2023)
- Automated Market Making and Arbitrage Profits in the Presence of Fees — → 2305.14604
- Automated Market Makers: A Practical Guide to Decentralized Exchanges and Cryptocurrency Trading (2023) — link
- Theory and Practice of Revenue Management (2005)
- Decentralized exchanges (2021)
- The adoption of blockchain-based decentralized exchanges (2021) — link
- The need for fees at a dex: How increases in fees can increase dex trading volume (2022)
and 27 more
- Uniswap v1 Core (2018) — link
- Uniswap v2 Core (2020) — link
- Uniswap v3 Core (2021) — link
- Uniswap v4 Core [Draft] (2023) — link
- JOE v2.1 Liquidity Book (2022) — link
- ALGEBRA Ecosystem: Decentralized exchange (2022) — link
- Automatic market-making with dynamic peg (2021) — link
- Mooniswap by 1inch.exchange (2020) — link
- MEV capturing AMM (McAMM) (2022) — link
- Censorship Resistance in On-Chain Auctions (2023) — link
- Flash boys 2.0: Frontrunning in decentralized exchanges, miner extractable value, and consensus instability (2020)
- The Costs of Swapping on the Uniswap Protocol — → 2309.13648
- Credible decentralized exchange design via verifiable sequencing rules (2022) — link
- High-frequency trading on decentralized on-chain exchanges (2021)
- The centralizing effects of private order flow on proposer-builder separation (2023) — link
- Logarithmic markets coring rules for modular combinatorial information aggregation (2007)
- A practical liquidity-sensitive automated market maker (2013)
- Twitter thread (2023) — link
- UniswapX (2023) — link
- Radical Markets: Uprooting Capitalism and Democracy for a Just Society (2018)
- Triangle Fees (2023) — link
- Predictable Losses of Liquidity Provision in Constant Function Markets and Concentrated Liquidity Markets (2023) — link
- Decentralised Finance and Automated Market Making: Predictable Loss and Optimal Liquidity Provision (2022)
- Automated Market Makers Designs Beyond Constant Functions (2023)
- Automated Market Making and Loss-Versus-Rebalancing (2024) — link
- Optimal Dynamic Fees for Blockchain Resources (2023) — link
- Multidimensional Blockchain Fees are (Essentially) Optimal (2024) — link
2 of 35 cited works are in the corpus; resolved via arXiv source bundles, Semantic Scholar and OpenAlex. Corpus-wide: 2518 linked papers.